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Summary  Denial  of  service  (DoS)  attack  is  an  attempt  of  the  attacker  to  disable  victim’s
machine  by  depleting  network  or  computing  resources.  If  this  attack  is  performed  with  more
than one  machine,  it  is  called  distributed  denial  of  service  (DDoS)  attack.  Covert  channels
are those  channels  which  are  used  for  information  transmission  even  though  they  are  neither
designed  nor  intended  to  transfer  information  at  all.  In  this  article,  we  investigated  the  possibil-
ity of  using  of  DDoS  attack  for  purposes  of  hiding  data  or  concealing  the  existing  covert  channel.
In addition,  in  this  paper  we  analyzed  the  possibility  of  detection  of  such  covert  communication
with the  well-known  statistical  method.  Also,  we  proposed  the  coordination  mechanisms  of  the
attack which  may  be  used.  A  lot  of  research  has  been  done  in  order  to  describe  and  prevent
DDoS attacks,  yet  research  on  steganography  on  this  ﬁeld  is  still  scarce.
© 2016  Published  by  Elsevier  GmbH.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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It  is  obvious  that  the  battle  for  the  security  of  computer
networks  will  be  constantly  present.  The  security  agencies
are  trying  to  distance  computing  resources  from  a  variety
of  attacks  and  methods  of  data  leaks,  while  the  computer
hackers  are  constantly  trying  to  ﬁnd  a  more  intuitive  way
for  a  smooth  and  efﬁcient  access  to  data.  One  of  the
challenges  facing  the  digital  forensics  is  the  detection  of
channels  used  for  data  leakage  and  elimination  of  such
threats.  Accordingly,  there  is  a  growing  interest  in  detecting
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).f  compromised  channels  and  machines  which  were  used
or  attack.  If  the  attack  or  data  leakage  has  occurred,  any
urther  efforts  are  made  to  collect  reliable  evidence  about
he  attack.  Often,  it  is  not  an  easy  task,  especially  in  the
ase  of  a  large  number  of  data  that  have  been  generated
y  an  attacker.
Network  steganography  is  a method  of  hiding  data  in
rdinary  network  ﬂow  in  order  to  achieve  covert  commu-
ication  and  it  was  ﬁrst  introduced  in  2003  by  Deepa  and
zczypiorski  (Kundur  &  Ahsan,  2003;  Szczypiorski,  2003).
zczypiorski  presented  basic  ideas  for  several  techniques,
hile  Deepa  examined  practical  applications  of  these  tech-
iques  and  the  usage  of  Internet  steganography  at  that  time.
ollowing  these  presentations,  a  lot  of  research  in  network
teganography  has  been  carried  out,  especially  in  the  ﬁeld
f  voice  over  Internet  protocol  (VoIP).
The  idea  of  hiding  data  in  network  ﬂow  can  be  divided
nto  two  types:  utilization  of  unused  packet  ﬁelds  and
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Figure  1  The  ﬁgure  show  the  number  of  packets  received  with  a  given  delay  during  the  experiment  which  is  explained  in  Berk
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tt al.  (2005).  The  horizontal  axis  shows  the  inter-arrival  time  in  s
eft image  —  two  spikes  show  that  a  covert  channel  communica
nformation  encoding  in  trafﬁc  behavior.  The  ﬁrst  type  is  a
ell-known  technique  that  emerged  from  old  Xmas  packets.
hese  packets  with  every  single  option  set  for  used  protocol
re  included  in  a  well-known  nmap  network  scanning  tool,
nd  they  were  named  Xmas  packets  because  they  look  like
right  bulbs  on  a  Christmas  tree.  These  packets  can  be  eas-
ly  detected  by  intrusion-detection  systems  (IDS),  or  more
dvanced  ﬁrewalls  (Mazurczyk  and  Szczypiorski,  2008).  The
econd  type,  encoding  information  in  trafﬁc  behavior,  was
rst  presented  in  2005  (Berk  et  al.,  2005).  This  idea  was
urther  modiﬁed  in  2008  by  Mazurczyk  and  presented  as  lost
udio  packets  steganography  (LACK)  solution  (Mazurczyk
nd  Szczypiorski,  2008)  for  VoIP  communication.
Covert  channels  were  ﬁrst  observed  and  deﬁned  in  the
id-1980s  as  a  result  of  the  rapid  development  of  com-
unication  networks.  Lampson  classiﬁed  communication
hannels  into  three  categories:  storage,  legitimate,  and
overt.  He  also  gave  the  ﬁrst  deﬁnition  of  covert  channels
tating  that  covert  channels  are  those  channels  which  are
sed  for  information  transmission  even  though  they  are  nei-
her  designed  nor  intended  to  transfer  information  at  all
Lampson,  1973).  In  the  last  10  years,  a  large  number  of
overt  channels  have  been  introduced,  and  a  great  develop-
ent  of  new  techniques  in  the  following  years  is  expected.
ll  these  techniques  can  signiﬁcantly  affect  the  level  of
ecurity  and  reputation  that  certain  communication  solu-
ions  offer.  Viewed  from  the  client’s  side,  it  is  reasonable  to
oubt  the  safety  and  quality  of  a  particular  communication
olution  which  has  weak  points  in  the  system  that  can  be
sed  for  the  undetected  leak  of  conﬁdential  data.  Because
f  that,  covert  channels  are  under  close  supervision  of  gov-
rnments  and  security  companies  that  aim  to  prevent  these
eaks.
Based  on  existing  techniques  we  can  deﬁne  certain  rules
hich  apply  to  the  hiding  data  with  network  steganography
echniques:
.  Selected  information  carrier  should  be  frequently  used,
which  makes  detection  considerably  difﬁcult.  If  one
wants  to  hide  information  in  a  rarely  used  protocol,  there
is  a  big  probability  that  network  ﬁrewalls  or  IDS  (intruder
detection  system)  will  raise  an  alarm.
.  Selected  carrier  must  create  a  lot  of  network  data  (i.e.
VoIP  trafﬁc,  IPTV  or  similar).  This  will  decrease  the  prob-
ability  of  detecting  information  that  is  hidden  inside  the
D
t
cds,  and  the  vertical  axis  shows  the  number  of  packets  received.
 is  in  place,  right  image  —  represents  normal  communication.
ordinary  data  since  many  IDS/IPS  systems  are  simply  not
efﬁcient  enough  to  process  huge  amounts  of  data  in  real-
time.
.  It  is  recommended  to  hide  smaller  amounts  of  data  in  the
ordinary  data  ﬂow  and  deliver  it  frequently  rather  hide
large  amounts  of  data  and  deliver  it  sporadically.  If  the
amount  of  the  hidden  data  in  a  package,  one  can  assume
that  those  data  are  just  simple  coincidence,  or  that  they
are  just  a  random  behavior  of  the  network.  If  those  values
are  quite  large,  there  is  a considerable  probability  they
will  be  intercepted  by  ﬁrewalls  or  IDS  somewhere  in  the
network  before  reaching  its  destination.
In  one  of  the  ﬁrst  papers  on  this  subject  (Berk  et  al.,
005),  an  approach  to  statistical  detection  of  covert  chan-
el  embedded  in  network  packet  delays  is  presented.  This
imple  technique  implies  the  existence  of  clear  differences
etween  the  packet  delay  and  it  is  based  on  the  probability
f  the  existence  of  covert  channel,  which  is  calculated  as
ollows:
CovChan =  1  − C
Cmax
(1)
here  Cu is  the  packet  count  at  the  mean  and  Cmax is  the
aximum  packet-count  of  the  histogram  which  is  shown  in
ig.  1.
The  difference  between  a  binary  covert  channel  (left
mage)  and  regular  trafﬁc  (right  image  in  Fig.  1) is  evident.
he  author  used  the  calculation  of  the  sample  mean  (aver-
ge)  value  of  the  presented  values  and  calculation  of  packet
ount  in  the  histogram  at  that  point.  For  covert-packet,  that
alue  should  be  a  very  low  while,  for  normal  trafﬁc  pattern,
he  mean  value  should  be  in  the  center  of  the  highest  spike.
herefore,  the  probability  of  having  converted  channel  is
nversely  proportional  to  the  ratio  C/Cmax.  If  the  ratio  is
maller,  the  probability  expressed  with  Eq.  (1)  is  higher.
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  situations  where  the  proposed
ethod  of  detection  can  be  unsuccessful.  We  suggest  the
ircumstances  in  which  this  situation  can  happen  and  we  try
o  explain  the  ways  they  occurred.In the  following  chapters,  the  organization  and  usage  of
DoS  attacks  to  hide  date  are  discussed,  continuing  with
he  discussion  of  the  proposed  detection  method  and  the
onclusion  in  the  last  section.
Whispering  through  DDoS  attack  97
Table  1  Attack  speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcations  Values
Duration  of  attack  (D) 35.34  s
Number  of  clients  244
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uFigure  2  Common  DDoS  network  architecture.
DDoS attacks
Denial  of  service  (DoS)  is  an  attempt  of  an  attacker  to
exhaust  the  resources  available  to  the  network,  application
or  service  so  that  real  users  cannot  gain  access.  If  this  attack
is  performed  with  more  than  one  machine,  it  is  called  dis-
tributed  denial  of  service  (DDoS)  attack.  Usually,  DDoS  is
performed  through  a  botnet,  which  can  count  up  to  several
hundreds  of  machines.  These  machines  are  usually  called
slaves  since  they  are  controlled  by  botnet  master  computers
(Fig.  2).  From  the  victim’s  perspective,  it  is  quite  difﬁcult  to
locate  initial  attacker  and  prevent  the  attack.  Additionally,
it  is  difﬁcult  for  the  victim  to  separate  the  trafﬁc  that  comes
from  actual  users  and  the  trafﬁc  that  is  generated  for  the
purposes  of  the  attack,  making  it  difﬁcult  to  stop  the  attack.
In  May  2014  Arbor  networks  announced  an  analysis  of  the
correlation  of  DDoS  attacks  with  important  political  dates
(Soluk,  2014);  and  the  results  show  that  DDoS  attacks  are  a
daily  occurrence.
CloudFlare  presented  statistical  results  regarding  DDoS
attacks  in  (Graham-Cumming,  2013),  and  explained  the  most
common  cases  of  DDoS  attack.  According  to  this  report,  most
common  DDoS  attacks  are  based  on  ‘‘ﬁre  and  forget’’  proto-
cols  like  UDP  or  ICMP,  and  97%  of  these  attacks  are  DNS  DDoS
attacks.  Cloudﬂare  believes  that  the  reason  for  this  are  lack
of  source  IP  authentication,  and  huge  number  of  open  DNS
recursors  which  can  be  used  to  amplify  desired  attack.  Also,
it  is  suggested  to  use  anycast  attack  dilution  as  the  ﬁrst  line
of  defense  against  these  attacks.
Taking  the  above  into  account,  we  assume  that  DDoS  can
be  used  as  a  cover  channel  due  to  the  following  reasons:
1.  DDoS  attacks  occur  on  a  daily  basis  around  the  world
which  means  that  they  are  not  unusual  in  networks.
2.  DDoS  mainly  involves  a  large  amount  of  data;  it  means
that  the  detection  of  the  covert  channel  is  even  harder
due  to  the  large  amount  of  data  which  needs  to  be
processed.  Mostly  this  is  not  feasible  to  perform  the
detection  in  real-time,  so  the  data  needs  to  be  stored
and  subsequently  analyzed  which  also  presents  difﬁcul-
ties  due  to  the  large  volume  of  trafﬁc.
3.  An  attacker  may  use  a  large  amount  of  data  which  is
sent  through  DDoS  attack  to  hide  the  existence  of  covert
communication  which  may  have  a  smaller  bandwidth.
Therefore,  we  assume  that  victim  wants  to  be  exposed
to  DDoS  attacked  which  serves  as  a  wrapper  for  a  covert
s
i
a
mAverage  number  of  messages  per  client  6193
Type  of  generated  messages  INVITE
hannel.  To  implement  this  idea  into  practice,  it  is  neces-
ary  to  consider  the  mechanism  of  coordination  between  the
achines  involved  in  the  attack.  If  the  data  volume  is  larger
han  the  communication  or  computing  capacity  of  the  vic-
im,  then  the  victim  will  not  be  able  to  process  information
as  hidden  and  the  whole  covert  communication  will  be  in
ain.  On  the  other  hand,  the  victim  wants  to  maximize  the
ow  of  covert  communication,  and  it  is  important  that  there
s  an  existing  mechanism  that  will  allow  her  to  control  the
ata  throughput.  In  the  following  section,  we  focus  on  this
roblem.
IP  ﬂood  attack
here  are  two  main  protocols  used  in  VoIP  call:  SIP  and  RTP.
he  former  is  used  for  establishing  and  changing  the  settings
f  the  session,  and  the  latter  for  exchanging  voice  packets.
n  VoIP,  SIP  ﬂooding  attacks  can  be  identiﬁed  as  DoS  attacks.
s  mentioned  above,  if  DoS  attack  is  executed  from  multi-
le  locations  (hosts),  it  is  called  a  DDoS  attack.  SIP  ﬂooding
ttacks  are  easy  to  launch  and  are  able  to  quickly  deplete
he  resources  of  both  networks  and  nodes.
In  our  experiment,  we  used  Asterisk  software  version
.8.13.0  as  the  victim,  which  was  installed  on  a machine
ith  Intel  Atom  D410,  1  GB  of  RAM,  8  GB  SSD  drive  and  Debian
NU/Linux  7.6  (Wheezy).  In  order  to  simulate  other  com-
onents  shown  in  Fig.  2, we  used  open  source  SIP  trafﬁc
enerator  SIPp  (Day  et  al.,  n.d.).  This  solution  is  frequently
sed  due  of  its  simplicity  and  customization  options.  SIPp
as  used  to  simulate  DDoS  attack  involving  24  clients.
esults  of  the  experiment  are  shown  in  Fig.  3,  and  the  spec-
ﬁcations  of  the  attack  are  presented  in  Table  1.
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  Asterisk  reacts  differ-
ntly  to  different  types  of  attack.  By  default,  it  does  not
ave  to  execute  detailed  queries  in  its  database  to  ﬁnd  spec-
ﬁcations  of  the  receiver  or  the  call  when  it  detects  OPTION
r  ACK  messages.  But  in  the  case  when  REGISTER  or  INVITE
essages  are  detected,  asterisk  will  require  much  more  CPU
esources  to  process  these  requests.  Therefore,  we  can  con-
lude  that  some  types  of  messages  can  cause  more  damage
han  other.
Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  the  usage  of  dif-
erent  types  of  messages  during  the  attack.  INVITE  message
s  accompanied  by  two  additional  SIP  messages,  one  200  OK
rom  receiver  and  ACK  additional  message  from  the  sender.
ut,  INFO  and  OPTION  messages  produce  only  one  additional
essage,  200  OK.  Such  sequence  of  SIP  messages  can  be
sed  for  coordination  of  the  attack  since  there  are  mes-
ages  which  are  transmitted  in  both  directions.  For  example,
f  host  (slave  machine  from  Fig.  2)  sends  INVITE  message
nd  does  not  receive  returning  message  from  victim,  it  can
ean  that  the  amount  of  data  which  is  sent  from  that  host
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F ter  35.34  s.  It  is  important  to  notice  an  ERROR  2605  message  which
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UDP  applications  on  the  hosts  are  set  to  be  run  with  dif-
ferent  intensities,  so  each  host  sends  a  different  amount  of
data  to  the  victim.  To  maintain  maximum  throughput,  each
host  every  second  increases  the  intensity  of  UDP  ﬂow  for
100  kbits.  Victim  measures  the  number  of  received  bits  on
UDP  socket  and  decides  whether  the  received  number  of  bits
is  lower  than  the  maximum  receiver  buffer  size  of  the  socket
(RcvBufSize).  If  the  number  of  received  bits  is  higher  than
RcvBufSize  value,  the  socket  needs  to  drop  the  packet  since
the  upper  OSI/ISO  layer  did  not  process  it  within  time  andigure  3  Result  of  DDoS  attack;  left  —  asterisk’s  response  af
tates that  asterisk  is  not  able  to  create  socket  to  process  incom
s  too  big  and  host  should  decrease  its  trafﬁc  rate.  Other-
ise,  the  arrival  of  feedback  message  from  victim  means
hat  the  rate  of  the  attack  is  acceptable  for  the  victim.  With-
ut  compromising  generality,  this  mechanism  is  very  easy  to
e  mapped  to  TCP  communication  since  TCP  is  connection
riented  protocol  (Fig.  4).
overt channel within DDoS attack
or  the  purpose  of  testing  we  performed  a  simulation  in
ell-known  network  simulator  ns-3  which  is  a  discrete-event
etwork  simulator  for  Internet  systems,  targeted  primar-
ly  for  research  and  educational  use.  ns-3  is  free  software,
icensed  under  the  GNU  GPLv2  license,  and  is  publicly  avail-
ble  for  research,  development,  and  use  (Stoffers  and  Riley,
012).
The  simulation,  as  shown  in  Fig.  5,  consists  of  10  nodes
hich  are  connected  in  a  star  topology  with  the  peer-to-
eer  links.  At  node  5  UDP  sink  application  was  installed  while
n  other  nodes1 UDP  client  application  was  installed.  In  this
xperiment,  we  assumed  that  the  attacker  wanted  to  utilize
ype  of  service  (TOS)  value  in  the  header  of  internet  proto-
ol  (IP)  packets  to  create  a  covert  channel.  Traditionally,
he  ﬁrst  three  IP  precedence  (RFC  791)  bits  were  supposed
o  be  used  in  TOS  Application  Routing  (RFC  1583).  The  TOS
eld  has  then  been  redeﬁned  as  the  Differentiated  Services
ode  Point  (RFC  2474)  which  consists  of  the  ﬁrst  6  bits  and
 bits  used  for  a  TCP  mechanism  called  explicit  congestion
otiﬁcation  (ECN)  deﬁned  in  RFC  3168  (Table  2).
For  the  purposes  of  experiment,  we  used  following  nota-
ion  in  covert  communication.  If  the  packet  with  decimal
OS  value  48  is  sent,  it  encodes  binary  ‘‘0’’;  if  the  packet
ith  decimal  TOS  value  160  is  sent  it  encodes  binary  ‘‘1’’n  covert  communication.  All  other  TOS  values  were  used
o  mask  the  covert  channel  and  to  make  confusion  to  the
etection  algorithm.
1 In this paragraph, all nodes except the node 5 are called ‘‘host’’
odes while node 5 is called ‘‘victim’’ node.
Figure  4  The  feedback  about  the  data  intensity;  Case  a  (up)
— sends  INVITE  message  and  the  arrival  of  feedback  message
(200 OK)  from  the  victim  means  that  the  rate  of  the  attack
is acceptable.  Otherwise,  if  there  is  no  feedback  message,  it
means that  the  intensity  of  the  attack  from  that  host  is  too
large and  host  should  decrease  its  trafﬁc  rate  (case  b  —  down).
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Table  2  ToS  values  used  for  communication  in  covert
channel.
Node  TOS
(decimal)
TOS
(hex)
Covert  channel
value
Node  0  0  0x00  —
Node  1  12  0x0C  —
Node  2  32  0x20  —
Node  3  48  0x30  Value  ‘‘0’’
Node 4  112  0x70  —
Node  6  136  0x88  —
Node  7 144  0x90  —
Node  8 152  0x98  —
b
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tFigure  5  10  nodes  connected  in  a  star  topology  with  peer-
to-peer  links.  Each  node  generates  UDP  and  TCP  trafﬁc  to  the
node 5.
socket  does  not  have  enough  storage  capabilities  to  store  it.
If  this  happen,  we  assume  that  the  amount  of  data  which  is
received  on  the  victim’s  machine  is  too  high  and  it  means
that  computing  capabilities  of  the  victim  are  depleted.  In
ns-3  simulator,  the  initial  value  of  RcvBufSize  is  1,048,576
bits.
Thus,  the  victim  needs  to  have  the  ability  to  control  the
incoming  data  ﬂow  from  host  machines.  Therefore,  every
host  machine  establishes  a  TCP  connection  with  the  victim
and  periodically  (each  4  s)  sends  a  keep-alive  packet  to  the
victim.  If  host  receives  acknowledge  to  the  sent  packet,  it
means  that  the  rate  of  UDP  ﬂow  is  acceptable  and  it  will  not
be  changed.  Otherwise,  if  the  acknowledge  from  the  victim
was  not  received,  the  rate  of  UDP  ﬂow  will  be  reduced  in
half.  In  this  way,  the  victim  can  easily  control  the  ﬂow  of
data.
DetectionAs  far  as  covert  channels  are  concerned,  two  criteria  are  ini-
tially  considered:  bandwidth  and  detectability.  Bandwidth
is  deﬁned  as  the  amount  of  hidden  information  that  can
r
t
l
a
Figure  6  The  ﬁgure  show  the  number  of  packets  received  with
experiment. The  horizontal  axis  shows  the  TOS  values  which  were  useNode  9 160  0xA0  Value  ‘‘1’’
e  transferred  per  packet  or  per  second,  while  detectabil-
ty  measures  the  probability  of  detection  of  the  hidden
nformation.  Usually,  these  two  are  connected,  since  higher
andwidth  requires  a  large  ﬂow  of  data,  thus  increasing  the
robability  of  detection  of  covert  communication.  However
n  the  case  of  DDoS,  it  is  not  necessarily  true.
Fig.  6  shows  the  number  of  packet  counts  on  the  victim’s
achine  which  was  obtained  during  the  experiment.  The
gure  on  the  left  shows  one  main  spike  in  the  middle  of
he  graph  and  other  values  which  are  scattered  around  the
iddle  value.  In  this  case,  the  probability  of  detection  of
aving  a  covert  channel,  expressed  with  Eq.  (1)  will  be  small
ince  the  ratio  C/Cmax is  high.
An  interesting  case  in  when  victim  evenly  spread  the
ncoming  data  using  its  coordination  mechanism  explained
bove  (the  ﬁgure  on  right).  In  that  case,  the  spikes  of  the
raph  will  have  similar  values  and  the  detection  of  covert
ommunication  will  be  decreased  even  more.
As  for  the  error  probability  (error  rate  for  zeros  being
eceived  as  one  and  otherwise),  it  depends  on  the  coordina-
ion  mechanism  of  the  attack.  If  the  amount  of  data  that  is
eceived  by  the  victim  is  below  the  RcvBufSize  value,  then
he  packet  will  be  processed  and  TOS  value  will  be  ana-
yzed.  Otherwise,  the  packet  needs  to  be  dropped  without
nalyzing  TOS  values  which  will  undermine  covert  channel.
 a  given  TOS  values  in  the  header  of  IPv4  packet  during  the
d,  and  the  vertical  axis  shows  the  number  of  packets  received.
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onclusion
n  this  paper,  we  analyzed  the  possibilities  of  implementing
f  covert  channels  within  DDoS  attacks.  We  proposed  the
echnique  which  may  be  used  for  coordination  between  the
odes  and  we  showed  that  statistical  detection  mechanism
ay  not  be  effective  for  covert  channels  that  are  hidden
n  the  much  larger  network  ﬂow.  The  use  of  unused  bits  in
acket  headers  may  be  very  effective  in  such  case.  In  addi-
ion,  the  channel  can  be  dynamically  oriented,  which  can
ake  it  difﬁcult  for  the  mechanism  of  detection  (i.e.  using
OS  values  in  ﬁrst  several  minutes  of  the  attack,  then  using
TL  values  for  next  several  minutes  or  similar).
Our  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  the  covert  chan-
els  through  DDoS  points  to  the  possibility  of  associating
dditional  information  in  the  network  ﬂow.  DDoS  attacks
appen  on  a  daily  basis,  and  the  usage  of  similar  network
ttacks  for  other  purposes  should  be  examined.  However,  it
s  important  to  emphasize  that  the  techniques  presented
ere  can  be  used  in  other  scenarios  regardless  of  DDoS
ttacks.
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